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1  Introduction 
Fruit and vegetable sectors are principally seen as sectors where small producers are able to 
participate due to their low demand on land and their high labor requirements. However, the 
concern exists that small producers’ participation in the international fruit and vegetable trade 
could be diminishing as a result of the increasing prevalence of food quality standards in the 
sector. Standards define the terms of chain membership, imply rules and conditions for 
participation, and hence lead to processes of (re)distribution within the chain (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005). For some producers, standards may open up new opportunities as they permit market 
access to particular market segments. At the same time, the process of (re)distributing market 
shares is accompanied by marginalization and exclusion, as standards may impose prohibitively 
high barriers for certain producers in terms of the short-term and long-term efforts needed for 
production under certification. This is particularly relevant since certification with private 
standards has become a major requirement for participation in fruit and vegetable markets 
worldwide. One of the most important private standards for fruit and vegetables is the 
EUREPGAP standard, which has now become quasi-mandatory for several export destinations 
(USAID, 2005).  
This paper aims to analyze two particular questions with regard to the distributional effects of 
standards: 1) which producers comply, and which do not; and 2) why do some producers comply 
while others do not?  
With respect to the first question, various surveys have mentioned the particular difficulties facing 
small producers within this new trading environment (e.g. Humphrey et al. 2004; Kleinwechter 
and Grethe 2006; Maertens and Swinnen 2006; World Bank 2005). However, most of these 
surveys have hypothesized that small producers are disadvantaged within the new trading 
environment on theoretical grounds without actually providing empirical evidence for this 
assertion. 
Regarding the second question, various papers have argued, based on the theoretical background 
of economies of scale, that small producers tend to comply to a lesser extent because of the higher 
cost of compliance. Even though this argument may well be to some extent true, it can be 
criticized because it neglects the complex socio-economic and institutional framework that 
influences a farmer’s decision to comply with a standard. 
A multidisciplinary perspective is necessary to analyze decisions to adopt or not to adopt a 
standard, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of why some producers comply with food 
quality standards while others reject them.  
This paper accordingly seeks to contribute to the debate by answering these two questions with 
regard to the Moroccan tomato export sector. It provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of 
the compliance decision behavior and the compliance process. The survey analyzes drivers for the 2  Christine Chemnitz 
compliance decision by comparing the determinants of the decision process of non-certified 
producers with those of certified ones. 
For its explanatory approach, this paper mainly draws on the theories of innovation adoption and 
diffusion research, since these make it possible to systemize the decision process and integrate it 
into a close network of economic, social and institutional determinants.  
The Moroccan tomato sector was chosen as the case study because of the increasing importance of 
private certification in this sector. Nearly 90% of its tomatoes are exported to the EU, where 
EUREPGAP is a major requirement. Tomatoes are the second most important horticultural export 
product of the country, and a wide range of producers are involved in the sector, from large-scale 
plantations cultivating more than 200 ha, to small producers with less than 10 ha. In addition, the 
sector has a particular social importance in that it offers income possibilities to those with little 
access to land, and moreover provides possibilities of employment in rural areas, where there tend 
to be few other alternative jobs.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background 
of the analysis, applying diffusion theory to the compliance process with food quality standards. 
Section 3 describes the methodology of the survey, including the theoretical framework and the 
data collection. Section 4 provides an overview of the structural and institutional environment of 
the Moroccan tomato sector, in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the compliance 
process. Section 5 discusses the results of the survey. Section 6 examines the similarities and 
differences among compliers and non-compliers. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions with 
regard to the impact of food quality standards on rural poverty in Morocco.  
2  Theoretical Background 
2.1  Standards – Innovations from the Producer Perspective 
Different approaches offer a variety of evidence to explain decision behavior and the decision 
process. With regard to the objective of the survey, a multidisciplinary analytical approach offers 
the possibility of linking the individual decision process to the effects of the institutional 
environment and thus of identifying drivers for or against compliance with food quality standards. 
Diffusion theory offers a particularly suitable analytical framework that identifies the determinants 
of the innovativeness of the actors involved.  
Diffusion theory is appropriate because food quality standards are, from a producer’s perspective, 
a special form of innovation. Rogers (2003: 101) defines an innovation to be an idea, practice or 
object that is perceived as new by an individual. In this context, diffusion theory can be applied to 
various process innovations in agricultural food chains.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  3 
However, there are some differences, as innovations from a traditional perspective lead to an 
increase in technical efficiency. By contrast, innovations in food quality typically result in higher 
food quality and/or in better information transfer of information on products and processes, but do 
not necessarily lead to some form of production advantage. Indeed, such innovations may actually 
be counterproductive to the technical production process of the firm (Walgenbach and Beck, 
2003). Food quality innovations only result in gains if the higher quality product is differentiable 
from lower quality products.
1  
With regard to the information asymmetry existing in the food trade
2, quality standards are used to 
overcome these market failures. Nadvi and Wältring (2002: 6) define standards as agreed criteria 
by which a product or service performance, its technical and physical characteristics and/or the 
process and conditions under which it has been produced or delivered, can be assessed. Standards 
may consist of individual measures, or can take the form of a bunch of different measures which 
the producer has to fulfill and which are externally audited. Consequently, food standards not only 
consist of innovations – the standard itself is a form of innovation.  
2.2  Applying the Innovation Decision Model to the Compliance Process with Food 
Standards – Strengths and Weaknesses  
Diffusion research identifies three time dimensions: 1) the innovativeness of an individual in 
relation to the other members of a social system; 2) the adoption rate within a social system; and 
3) the decision process (König, 2006). This subsection concentrates on the third of these 
dimensions, the decision process.  
Rogers (2003: 168) defines the decision process as an information-seeking and information-
processing activity in which an individual is motivated to reduce uncertainty about the advantages 
and disadvantages of an innovation.  
Diffusion research relies on the assumption of a multistage decision model. Rogers (2003) has 
developed a five-stage model where the decision-making unit passes from hearing about an 
innovation for the first time, to forming an attitude towards the innovation, on to deciding whether 
to adopt or to reject it, to implementing the new idea, and finally to confirming this decision.  
The decision model provides three main advantages when it comes to analyzing the compliance 
process with food standards. Firstly, it clearly systemizes the decision process, distinguishing the 
different stages of the whole process and thereby making it possible to identify the determinants of 
the decision process, which might differ according to the stage. Secondly, the model puts the 
                                                 
1   Akerlof (1972) explored this phenomenon for the “lemons” market.  
2   This asymmetry results from the fact that food products include various quality aspects, e.g. technical value, 
sensory quality, nutritional value, food safety as well as idealistic and psychological values (Brockmeier, 1993; 
Wiegand, 1997). The technical value and the sensory quality assessed by the consumer, and the nutritional value 
and food safety can be assessed in the final product by third parties (via laboratory tests); however, most idealistic 
values are Potemkin attributes (Tietzel and Weber, 1991) and cannot be assessed in the final good.  4  Christine Chemnitz 
decision-maker at the center of the analysis, while at the same time taking interlinkages with the 
institutional environment into account. Thirdly, it combines various schools of thinking, including 
those of economics, education, rural sociology and geography to form an analytical framework of 
diffusion (Rogers, 2003).  
However, the model can be criticized for formulating a relatively simplistic view of both the 
decision process and the final decision to adopt or reject an innovation. It is a mistake to see the 
decision process as linear; instead, it can be paused and rethought at every stage (Rogers, 2003). In 
addition, the model treats the adoption decision as a bivariate variable, where the only two 
possible options are either to comply or to reject. In reality, this decision is much more nuanced, 
and various potential responses exist. For compliance with food standards, Henson and Heasman 
(1998) explore compliance, which they show ranges from no-compliance to partial compliance 
and finally to full compliance. Kleinwechter (2005) even mentions over-compliance with 
standards, whereby larger firms in particular seek to obtain a marketing advantage.  
Furthermore, the shortcomings of the decision model regarding the analysis of food safety 
innovations are reflected in the diffusion process, which excludes some aspects which are of major 
importance for the diffusion process of food standards. Rogers (2003: 5) defines diffusion as the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system. Even though this definition covers much of what is important for the 
analysis of the compliance process with food quality standards, it is important to note the aspects 
that the definition does not include. Four major shortcomings can be identified in this regard.  
First, as Strang and Meyer (1993) show, the definition excludes decision-making processes where 
actors’ choices were not informed by the activities and choices of others. This aspect is of 
particular relevance for the compliance process with food safety and quality standards of small 
producers, who are extremely dependent on external sources of information (Henson and 
Heasman, 1998; Yapp and Freeman, 2004). A large enterprise may internally generate information, 
whereas a small enterprise is rather in the position of a recipient of information. With respect to 
compliance with food quality standards, this implies that whenever external sources of information 
are unavailable, small producers will be unable to start the compliance process.  
Second, the diffusion process has been widely criticized for underestimating the institutional 
environment. Diffusion theory mainly concentrates on internal production processes, thereby 
failing to give the institutional environment of the decision-making unit sufficient importance 
(Walgenbach and Beck, 2003). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pronounce the importance of 
institutional isomorphism
3 for the diffusion process. Walgenbach and Beck (2003) analyze this 
phenomenon in their survey of compliance decision processes with the ISO 9000 standard in 
Germany. They show that enterprises under uncertainty tend to conform more closely to the 
institutional expectations of their trading partners. Rational conformity with efficiency aspects of 
                                                 
3    Institutional isomorphism is defined as the tendency of institutions to form an homogeneous environment 
(Walgenbach and Beck, 2003: 499).    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  5 
the production process is becoming less important, while the importance of institutional legitimacy 
which is guaranteed by homogeneous institutional structure is correspondingly increasing.  
Third, the importance of concepts such as governance and pressure tend to be underestimated 
within value chains. Diffusion research includes the impact of the social system
4 with its 
horizontal network interrelations, norms and ethical values in the analysis (Rogers, 2003), but it 
does not provide an analytical framework to analyze it (König, 2006). Diffusion research has 
neglected in particular vertical coordination and vertical relations, including concepts of 
governance and power among participants of a value chain, even though vertical relations are 
known to be particularly important for information transmission (from the buyer to the producer) 
and in terms of pushing decision-making units in a certain direction (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002). Vertical relations have been analyzed in particular in value-chain analysis literature, which 
analyzes the cross-border linkages between firms in global production (e.g. Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  
Fourth, diffusion research has been criticized for failing to take into consideration the dynamic 
interdependencies between the individual and its environment and their alternating effects (König, 
2006: 101), despite the fact that these are seen as an important aspect explaining technological and 
structural development in the agricultural sector (König, 2006).  
3  Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1  The Analytical Framework 
The theoretical discussion has explored the explanatory potential of diffusion theory for the 
analysis. However, with respect to the shortcomings discussed in Section 2, the perspective of the 
decision model has been modified in order to make it easier to recognize the interlinkages between 
the decision-making unit and the institutional environment.  
                                                 
4   A social system is a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem-solving to accomplish a common goal 
(Rogers, 2003: 23).  6  Christine Chemnitz 
Figure 1:   Analytical framework  
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Source: own illustration 
Figure  1 shows that the decision process is, to a large extent, not directly affected by the 
determinant variables, but also indirectly through the perceived value of the standard. The 
perceived value of compliance can be considered as belief in the costs and benefits related to the 
innovation (Frambach and Schillewaert, 1999, DeSarbo et al., 1998). The perceived value of 
compliance must offer some kind of social, institutional or economic incentive for the decision-
making unit to consider adoption seriously. Imperfect information may lead to a difference 
between the perceived value and the real value of compliance. This difference is called the error 
cost (Ogus, 1992).  
The decision process is determined by uncertainty, since the decision-making unit can never be 
informed about all the causal linkages in the decision situation, and it bases its decision on 
assumptions of future developments (e.g. market development). The extent to which the decision-
making unit experiences uncertainty as an impeding factor for the decision process mainly 
depends on personal characteristics and the complexity of the decision. 
Each stage of the decision model is represented by a dependent variable which is determined 
directly or indirectly by the three groups of determinants, as Figure 1 shows. At the knowledge 
stage, the dependent variable is represented by the cost of information. These represent the costs 
incurred by the decision-making unit in order to receive a certain level of information which is 
sufficient to formulate an attitude towards the standard. The level of knowledge needed to 
formulate an attitude may differ tremendously among producers, however. At the attitude stage 
and the decision stage, the dependent variables can turn out to be positive or negative. Both stages 
are affected indirectly by the determinants through the perceived value of compliance. On the   The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  7 
implementation stage, the dependent variables are the cost and benefit of compliance. The 
producers face at this stage for the first time the real cost of compliance (except for the cost of 
information during the knowledge stage). The benefit of compliance is seldom immediately 
apparent, since investments in food quality standards are of a long-term nature. The same takes 
place at the monitoring stage. This is partly affected by the real costs and benefits of compliance, 
as well as the perceived costs and benefits related to future market development.  
3.2  Data Collection  
Research data were collected in 2006 by conducting semi-structured interviews with 63 Moroccan 
tomato producers in the region of Souss Massa (which was chosen because more than 70% of total 
tomato exports come from this zone). The survey concentrates on the EUREPGAP standards, 
since EUREPGAP has turned out to be the most important private certificate at the farm level in 
trading relations with EU partners.  
The total sample was taken out of a population of around 600 producers which supply at least 
partly the export market (APEFEL, 2006) of which around 207 are EUREPGAP-certified 
(EUREPGAP, 2006). To guarantee a sufficiently high number of EUREPGAP-certified producers, 
the total sample was split into two sub-samples: one certified (30 interviewees) and the other not 
certified (33 interviewees). 
A questionnaire was developed for the two sample groups which contains a qualitative as well as a 
quantitative part. The questionnaire was developed with respect to the theoretical framework 
discussed in subsection 3.1 and aims at collecting data on the determinants of the decision process.  
The analysis of the data consists of two major steps. First, data were analyzed in order to identify 
any driving or impeding determinants in the decision process. In a second step, the analysis sought 
to identify particular differences among the two groups of compliers and non-compliers.  
Before turning to the discussion of the results in Section 5, the following section will briefly 
provide an overview of the structure of the Moroccan tomato sector.  
4  The Moroccan Tomato Sector 
4.1  Economic Importance and Structure of the Moroccan Tomato Sector 
Horticulture is one of the most relevant segments of the Moroccan agricultural sector. In addition 
to its economic importance, the sector is also socially important, accounting for a high share in 
rural employment (WTO, 2003). Within the horticultural sector, tomato production plays an 
important role. The Moroccan tomato sector has a dual structure. Production for the domestic and 
export markets is usually separated. While tomatoes for the export market are always produced in 
technically highly advanced production systems in plastic greenhouses, tomatoes for the national 
market mainly stem from open field production.  8  Christine Chemnitz 
Nevertheless, interlinkages exist on both sides. Tomatoes originally produced for the export 
market but which are not of sufficient quality are finally sold on the national market. And 
greenhouse producers which mostly supply the domestic market sell their products to the export 
market whenever there is demand (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  
While open-field production for the domestic market takes place all over the country, the 
production of greenhouse tomatoes is mainly located in a regional cluster in the south Atlantic 
coastal strip in the region of Souss Massa. About 64% of the area is located in the region and 74% 
of total production originates there (APEFEL, 2002).  
Tomatoes rank second on Morocco’s export list of agricultural goods, with an annual export value 
of € 118 million in 2003 (FAO, 2007). On average, in 2003/04 and 2004/05 Morocco exported 
228,738.50 tons of tomatoes, of which 207,158.50 tons were destined for the EU (EACCE, 2007).  
Around 30% of tomato producers are smallscale farmers who cultivate less than 5 ha. Their 
production area represents only about 10-15% of the total production area for early tomatoes. The 
majority of the producers cultivate an area between 5-20 ha. Farms belonging to this group 
cultivate around 50% of the total tomato area. Only 10-15% of the farms are larger than 20 ha, but 
they represent around 40% of the early tomato area (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  
The production and marketing chain can be subdivided into three major levels: the production or 
farm level, the packing level, and the exporting level. The Moroccan export sector shows a highly 
integrated value chain (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005).  










































production  Farmers 
Cooperatives 
Non-integrated Exporters 
40-55%  35-40% >10% 
Source: Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  9 
As shown in Figure 2 the largest part of production, between 40 and 55%, is produced in 
completely integrated export structures. These may either take the form of producers of various 
sizes, which are organized into farmers’ cooperatives at the packing station level, or in enterprises 
which contain all levels of the production and marketing chain (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005). The 
second important organizational form of the sector is that of semi-integrated exporters. These are 
large enterprises which have their own private packing stations where they process products from 
their own farms. In addition, these enterprises process and sell tomatoes from other producers on a 
commission basis (Chemnitz and Grethe, 2005). The least important organizational form of the 
sector is that of the non-integrated exporters, which represent less than 10% of the exported early 
tomatoes. These exporters take the tomatoes on a commission basis or buy them from several 
different small and medium-sized producers. There are around 12-15 exporter groups in the sector, 
of which the largest three export around 70% of total tomato exports (Chemnitz and Grethe, 
2005).  
4.2  Prevalence of Legal and Private Food Standards in the Moroccan Export Sector  
Since Moroccan exports concentrate on the European market, production is mainly determined by 
the legal and private requirements of EU buyers. While food safety, hygiene, traceability, social 
and environmental requirements are comparatively new, marketing standards for tomatoes for the 
EU market have been in place since the early 1970s. EU Regulation 1035/72 (OJ L118, 
20/05/1972) clearly specifies the size, color and caliber of tomatoes imported to the European 
market. To date, the EU’s acceptance of the maximum residue levels (MRL) of pesticide products 
and its requirements for traceability are of specific importance for the sector. The so-called 
umbrella regulation 178/2002 (OJ L 031, 01/02/2002) lays down the general principles and 
requirements of EU food law on all stages of production, processing and distribution. The most 
relevant articles for the Moroccan export sector are Articles 11-14 about food safety requirements, 
and Articles 14-20 about traceability requirements which came into force on 1 January 2005. 
Since January 2006 the umbrella regulation has been complemented by Regulation 882/2004 on 
official food and feed controls (OJ L 165/1, 30/04/2004). Finally, Regulation 90/642 fixes 
maximum levels d for pesticide residues in and on fruits and vegetables (OJ L 350, 14/12/90).  
However, private food quality initiatives are increasingly becoming more important than the legal 
food standards. In the Moroccan tomato export sector, the most important private certificate at the 
farm level is the EUREPGAP standard.
5 The normative documents representing the EUREPGAP 
standard include aspects of integrated pest management, traceability, hygiene measures and 
MRLs.  
The importance of EUREPGAP to the EU market varies among individual member countries. 
According to several interviewees, the UK and the Scandinavian countries require the highest 
quality standards. Most retailers in these countries demand, in addition to EUREPGAP 
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certification, private certificates from the particular buyer (e.g. Tesco’s “Natures Choice” and 
Marks & Spencer’s “From Farm to Fork”). By contrast, interviewees characterized the French, 
German, Spanish and Swiss markets as being in a state of transition; retailers prefer buying 
EUREPGAP-certified produce, but are still prepared to buy non-certified products when no 
EUREPGAP-certified products are available.  
In Morocco, the number of certified producers has increased tremendously in recent years. To start 
off, some producers were certified in 2002 but, in the following two years, only a few other large 
producers followed (APEFEL, 2006). The rapid increase in certification only started in 2005. 
Today, around 207 out of 600 producers are certified (EUREPGAP, 2006). An unpublished survey 
conducted by APEFEL (2006) announced that in quantitative terms, Morocco could supply more 
than three-quarters of its exported tomatoes as EUREPGAP-certified. The largest ten exporters
6 
can supply 140,000 tons of EUREPGAP-certified tomatoes and own nearly 1,000 ha of certified 
greenhouses (APEFEL, 2006). Hence, a tremendous gap exists in the Moroccan export sector 
regarding the certified quantity and the number of certified producers.  
Various interviewees indicated that most very large exporters tend to be EUREPGAP-certified, 
whereas the picture is more heterogeneous for medium and small producers. The following section 
analyzes why producers finally decide to comply – or not to comply – with the EUREPGAP 
standard.  
5  Compliance with Food Safety Requirements: Results of the Survey 
5.1  The Information Stage 
The cost of information reflects the monetary and physical efforts the decision-making unit has to 
undertake to receive a certain level of information that is needed to formulate an attitude towards 
the standard. Information costs can be split into two groups: 1) costs for initial awareness 
information; and 2) costs for knowledge information (Rogers, 2003).  
Awareness information captures all the efforts the decision-making unit has to make in order to 
find out about the possible options for a decision, and it has to feel the need to enter into a decision 
process. Regarding compliance with food quality standards, the “awareness information” is 
defined as the first knowledge that a producer has of the existence and importance of a standard. 
This information on food standards may be transmitted to the producer by several means such as 
extension services, trading partners, mass media, as well by personal relations with other 
participants in the sector. The more communication about a certain standard is included in the 
communication structure of the sector, the less individual efforts producers have to make to find 
out something about it. However, the awareness information proves to be the first major burden of 
compliance in many cases, especially for producers that tend to be less included in information 
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channels, that have less access to modern sources of information, and that are unable to find out 
information by themselves. 
The survey results show that knowledge of public standards such as MRLs and Traceability has 
been widespread in the sector for more than five years. The picture is slightly different regarding 
knowledge of the EUREPGAP standard. Even though all interviewees bar one knew of 
EUREPGAP, most (30%) indicated that they had only known about it for a year. A further 27% 
had known about EUREPGAP for two years, and 17% for three years. Finally, most interviewees 
(70%) knew nothing about more specific standards such as “Nature’s Choice” (Tesco) or “From 
Farm to Fork” (Marks and Spencer).  
These results indicate that public standards as well as EUREPGAP are part of the communication 
structure of the sector, and that information on the existence of standards is communicated 
horizontally within the sector. Both the certified and non-certified interviewees indicated that the 
group of “other producers” was the most important source of initial information on the standard. 
As the second important source of information, certified producers mentioned packing stations, 
while non-certified producers mentioned the vendors of phytosanitary products. This difference 
suggests that there are structural differences between certified and non-certified producers, with the 
former tending to receive information from downstream actors along the value chain, while the latter 
tend to receive information from horizontally involved participants.  
The two groups differ further vis-à-vis the principal source of information on EUREPGAP, as 
Figure 3 shows.  
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Nearly all certified producers indicated that packing stations or consulting organizations were their 
major source of information. The group of non-certified producers also stated that packing stations 
were their principal source of information on EUREPGAP, followed by the categories of other 
producers and phytosanitary vendors. However, even though both groups reported that packing 
stations were their most important source of information, non-certified producers possess less 
information on EUREPGAP. This can be interpreted in two different ways: either certification 
leads to better knowledge of the standard, or the certified producers possessed better knowledge of 
the standard to start with, which finally was the main reason why they decided to become 
certified. 
One reason why certified producers tend to receive more detailed information on EUREPGAP 
from downstream actors can be found in their higher level of vertical integration in the value 
chain.  
Table 1:   Producers’ integration in the value chain 
 
Owner  
of a station 
Not the owner  
of a station  Total 
Certified  22  8  30 
Non-certified  6  27  33 
Total  28  35  63 
Source: own calculations. 
As Table 1 shows, 73% of certified producers are involved at the higher chain level. This might 
take the form of being a member of a cooperative or being the owner of a company.  
Packing stations employ quality managers who accompany the compliance process of their 
members. Consequently, the costs of information are indirect at the farm level. The certification 
process was not supported according to any of the interviews without the integration of the 
producer in the downstream level. 
Certified producers which do not receive support from the packing station internalize the 
generation of the needed knowledge for the certification process by hiring consultant 
organizations. These supply “packages” contain consulting for the entire upgrading process, 
including all relevant steps up to the final external audit. Complete “EUREPGAP packages” cost, 
depending on the size of the farm, between 2,000 and 3,000 €.  
To conclude, the results of the survey show that the costs of obtaining initial information on the 
EUREPGAP standard are relatively low as the standard is commonly encountered in the daily 
communication of the sector. More specific information on the standard, however, has to be 
generated internally by the producer, either by hiring a production level consultancy or at the 
packing station level.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  13 
5.2  The Attitude Stage  
The information stage is followed by the attitude stage, in which the decision-making unit forms 
an opinion on the standard. This reflects how it experiences the potential benefits and perceived 
value of compliance, which are mainly affected by how the decision-making unit perceives 
uncertainty regarding its knowledge of future costs and benefits.  
This depends on the personal characteristics of the decision-making unit as well as on the external 
influence on the producer. The way that non-certified decision-making units experience the costs, 
benefits and risks of the standard and the feasibility of becoming a certified producer plays an 
important role in the process of formulating an attitude, especially since small producers often lack 
the possibility to receive information from various different sources (Fairman and Yapp, 2004).  
Table 2:   Benefit of the EUREPGAP standard as experienced by non-certified producers  
Benefit of EUREPGAP  Number of responses 
Better prices   3 
Preferential supplier status  0 
Better commercialization  6 
Other benefits   2 
No known producer with a direct benefit  22 
Source: own calculations. 
As Table 2 shows, non-certified producers believe the benefit of the EUREPGAP certification to 
other producers to be relatively low, with only 11 interviewees aware of someone who had 
benefited from certification. The most important benefits for certified producers according to non-
certified producers are “better possibilities for commercialization”. Only two interviewees 
however indicated that they knew someone who receives better prices due to certification.  
In contrast to this rather negative experience of their colleagues’ certification, nearly all non-
certified interviewees had a positive attitude towards certification. Except for one interviewee, all 
producers underlined their willingness to be certified whenever given the chance to do so.  
The most important motivation for certification is the fear of losing future market share, a concern 
stressed by 29 out of the 33 non-certified interviewees. However, the risk of losing market share in 
the future seems to be relatively abstract to most non-EUREPGAP certified producers, with 88% 
indicating that they had never faced or heard of any sanctions because of their non-compliance. As 
depicted in Table 3, only three producers indicated that they face disadvantages in the near future 
because of non-certification. One of them receives lower prices, while the other two will be 
excluded from the packing station if they fail to start the certification process in 2007.  14  Christine Chemnitz 
Table 3:   Sanctions in case of non-compliance  
  Changing the producer Better prices No sanctions No answer  Total 
Certified  22  0  7  1  30 
Non-certified  2  1  29  1  33 
Total  24  1  36  2  63 
Source: own calculations.  
In contrast, the analysis of those producers that were certified shows that 22 out of 30 interviewees 
face sanctions from their packing station in case of non-compliance. All 22 producers indicated 
that they risked losing market share in case of non-compliance, as their buyers would change to 
other suppliers.  
Summarizing the results of the attitude stage, the survey shows that most non-certified 
interviewees tend to be positive towards the EUREPGAP standard even though they experience 
the direct benefit of certified producers as marginal. A general concern exists that they could lose 
market share in case of non-compliance. However, the survey results suggest that non-certified 
producers experience market losses as a relatively abstract idea.  
5.3  Decision Stage 
In the decision stage the producer actively undertakes activities which finally lead to a positive or 
negative decision (Rogers, 2003). This might entail for example actively searching for information 
about the standard, or developing a deeper understanding of the specific steps needed to 
implement the standard at farm level.  
28 out of the 33 non-certified producers indicated that they had relatively concrete knowledge 
about the changes needed on their farm for compliance, and 20 even expressed concrete ideas 
about the level of investment needed.
7  
                                                 
7   It is important to outline that the survey does not assess whether the perceived cost corresponds to the actual cost.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  15 
Figure 3:   Perceived cost of compliance of non-certified producers per ha 




























Source: own calculations. 
Figure 3 depicts the extremely high variance of perceived costs among non-certified interviewees. 
The lowest perceived cost of compliance amounts to less than 50 €/ha, and the highest at around 
1,975 €/ha.  
The reasons why interviewees perceived the cost of compliance so differently varied, ranging 
from personal characteristics to the actual technical level of production to knowledge on the 
EUREPGAP standard. The survey results point to the fact that more informed interviewees 
indicated higher perceived compliance costs.  
Even though nearly all non-certified producers tended to have a positive attitude towards the 
standard (as expressed by their indication to become certified if the opportunity arises), none had 
finally taken a positive decision in favor of certification. As the main reasons for non-certification, 
the interviewees indicated insufficient information on EUREPGAP and a lack of financial 
capacity. However, answers related to a lack of information on EUREPGAP have to be interpreted 
carefully, since all producers could theoretically hire a consulting organization to provide them 
with better information and to accompany the certification process. Consequently, the “lack of 
information” may also be another way of expressing a lack of financial capacity.  
The lack of financial capacity as a reason for non-compliance seems convincing, since the largest 
part of short-term investment is required for technical upgrading of farms, and these costs have to 
be met immediately. Even though some producers receive credits from their cooperatives, access 
to credit remains difficult, especially for small, less organized and less educated farmers. The third 
obstacle to certification experienced by producers is the uncertainty they face in terms of highly 
fluctuating prices. This is especially true for producers without a steady relationship with buyers 16  Christine Chemnitz 
or packing stations. Interviewees stated that in order to become certified, they would need a firm 
guarantee on prices and quantity.  
To sum up, most non-certified interviewees have concrete ideas on the requirements of the 
EUREGPGAP standard. Nevertheless, none have decided in favor of certification up till now, 
which can largely be attributed to their reluctance to invest owing to uncertainty about price 
developments and export possibilities. All interviewees found the idea of certification rather 
abstract, and they do not see a direct need for certification as the benefits of certification appear 
marginal, and there is little pressure from their trading partners (see subsection 5.2).  
5.4  The Implementation Stage 
In the implementation stage, producers are for the first time confronted with the real costs and 
benefits of the standard. Figure 4 depicts the real costs of compliance for the certified interviewees.  
Figure 4:   Cost of compliance per ha and year  




























  recurrent cost,   non-recurrent cost  
Source: own calculations. 
The costs of compliance can be broken down into recurrent and non-recurrent costs. Even though 
most interviewees experience non-recurrent costs as more of an obstacle, they only add a small 
part to the total cost of compliance. The major cost components of non-recurrent costs are 
investments in the technical upgrading process of the farm (e.g. in buildings and markers).
8 By 
contrast, the largest component of the recurrent costs of compliance is additional costs for skilled 
labor. Only four producers indicated that they did not employ any additional labor at all. On 
                                                 
8   Time periods for depreciation rely on own plausibility considerations.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  17 
average, certified producers employ one or two additional skilled workers for every 15 ha. A 
skilled worker earns between 200 and 250 €/month. Other recurrent cost components, such as the 
certificate for the standard or investment in safety cloth, only add a small part to the total cost of 
compliance. 
Figure 4 shows that the degree of variance regarding compliance costs is strong. The minimum 
costs of compliance are about 35 €/ha per year, while the maximum cost of compliance are nearly 
1,500 €/ha per year. To explain the high level of variance, data were analyzed with respect to farm 
size as a potential determinant for cost differences among producers. 
A negative correlation of -0.589
9 is identified between the variables of farm size and cost of 
compliance per ha and year. The survey results suggest that large-scale farms benefit from 
economies of scale both in terms of non-recurrent costs (-0.558) as well as in recurrent ones (-
0.327). However, the degree of correlation only ranges between low and medium, which indicates 
that non-recurrent costs are influenced more by other determinants than by farm size (i.e. the 
technical level before compliance).  
Furthermore, the data show a low level of correlation between recurrent cost and farm size. The 
largest component of the recurrent cost is additional labor costs. Even though some very small 
farms face relatively high additional labor costs per ha, no significant negative correlation is found 
between the size of the farm and labor costs per ha and year.  
Another factor mentioned by Kleinwechter (2005) that has a relevant effect on the cost of 
compliance is the intention of the producer to which level he wants to upgrade its farm. Even 
though 34% of the producers indicate greater compliance in at least one category of the 
EUREPGAP protocol, no significant correlation is found among the compliance level and the cost 
per ha and year.  
Analysis of how certified producers benefit shows that they experience very varied benefits from 
compliance. The largest number of interviewees (41.0%) indicated that certification had only 
brought them medium benefits
10, compared with an almost equal number who stated that they had 
received high to very high benefits (27.6%) or low to very low benefits (26.0%). Table 4 below 
breaks down the benefits and perceived benefits of certified producers according to category.  
                                                 
9   Correlation is calculated by Sperman’s ROH, since both variables were not normally distributed.  
10   On a scale from 1 to 8, high benefits are those that range between 7 and 8; medium benefits between 3 and 5; and 
low benefits 1 and 2.  18  Christine Chemnitz 
Table 4:   Benefits of EUREPGAP certification 
  Responses 
Benefits of certified producers  Nr.  Percent 
Better prices  2  3.7% 
Better marketing conditions  13  24.1% 
Better market access  7  13.0% 
Better prices in future  1  1.9% 
New market access in future  9  16.7% 
EUREPGAP minimizes the risk of losing market share  22  40.7% 
Total  54  100.0% 
Source: own calculations 
Only two producers indicated that they have received better prices since they became certified. 
However, both underline that certification alone does not change prices. Rather, new marketing 
strategies that accompany certification bring about higher prices by opening up new markets. 
However, several interviewees stated that, especially in the 2005/6 export season, prices had 
decreased tremendously, regardless of whether producers were certified or not. This finally led to 
the unfortunate fact that most producers that became certified in 2005 received lower prices with 
certification than prior to certification in 2004.  
In terms of marketing, 13 producers indicated that they had better marketing possibilities with the 
certificate, while another 10 interviewees hoped to have better marketing conditions in the future. 
Most interviewees however stated that the most important benefit of EUREPGAP is that it 
minimizes the risk of potential market share losses. The potential of losing market share is seen as 
a very concrete threat in case of non-certification. As shown in Table 2 (subsection 5.2), 22 out of 
30 producers fear losing customers in case of non-certification.  
The results of the implementation stage can be summarized as follows. First, compliance costs are 
only weakly correlated with farm size. Second, EUREPGAP functions as an additional marketing 
argument regarding the benefits of compliance. However, the benefits of certification depend on 
the marketing strategy adopted: it is not the certification itself which contains certain benefits.  
6  Similarities and Differences among Compliers and Non-compliers  
This section aims to analyze whether any patterns exist for compliers and non-compliers.  
The survey results affirm the existing assumption that large farms are certified to a larger extent 
than small and medium-sized farms. The two latter groups show a very diverse picture. While all 
bar three of the farms in the sample larger than 25 ha are EUREPGAP-certified, no particular 
pattern is apparent for farms between 5 and 25 ha.    The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  19 
There are various reasons for the strong tendency on the part of large farms to become certified. 
According to the interviewees, certification primarily matters in order to fulfill the “wishes” of the 
trading partners. Hence, certification of large farms rather reflects the producers willingness and 
their understanding of the importance of the quality of their products to their trading partners. 
However, various interviewees of very large farms indicated that the EUREPGAP certification is 
probably not particularly necessary in order to guarantee the products quality as consumers in any 
case trust the high quality of their products as a result of the direct and constant contact that large-
scale farms tend to have with their trading partners.  
In contrast, certification of smaller farms which lack the direct contact to their buyers would 
increase their level of conformity and open up possibilities for strategic horizontal partnerships 
and for vertical coordination. As the picture for farms between 5 and 25 ha regarding certification 
is particularly varied, following discriminant analysis particularly concentrates on this group. Five 
main statements can be made in this regard. 
1) Certified farms show a higher level of vertical integration. Discriminant analysis shows highly 
significant differences among certified and non-certified producers related to their level of 
vertical integration. While 75% of certified producers were integrated at the downstream level, 
only 12% of the non-certified producers were. This highly significant difference underlines the 
importance of vertical integration – or at least vertical coordination – in guaranteeing the infor-
mation flow between producers and consumers in both directions. It seems that direct contact to 
clients in particular often leads to a positive decision regarding certification. This is again 
underlined by the fact that 81% of certified producers indicated that they had experienced 
sanctions in case of non-compliance, compared with only 33% of non-certified producers. 
Consequently, the survey results hint that even though size plays an important role, it is largely 
the organizational level which leads to a positive decision being taken by small to medium-sized 
farms.  
2) Certified producers cooperate with certified packing stations. Another highly significant difference 
among certified and non-certified farms is the quality level of downstream actors. 79% of 
certified producers indicated that their packing station is certified with the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC), whereas only 11% of non-certified producers had trading relations with 
certified packing stations. This underlines how important the consistent fulfillment of quality 
requirements is along the whole value chain. Several interview partners stated that EUREPGAP 
certification without certification of the downstream actor makes no sense from a marketing 
perspective.  
3) Certified producers have seen their market share develop positively over the last five years. 
Diffusion theory assumes that innovations take place in economically increasing branches of an 
industry. This assumption could be verified in the survey, since 75% of the certified producers 
indicated that they had benefited from positive exports within the last five years, compared with 
only 23% of non-certified producers. 20  Christine Chemnitz 
4) Certified producers employ skilled workers. At least one highly skilled person works on 88% 
of certified farms; by contrast, only 24% of non-certified farms employ highly qualified 
employees. The employment of highly skilled workers tends to be of particular importance 
since the compliance with EUREPGAP demands a certain level of human capital not only from 
the owner of the farm but as well from the employees. A certain motivation and understanding 
of the standard is necessary for compliance.  
5) Certified producers do not possess a higher level of education. Data analysis shows no 
significant difference between the educational level of certified producers in comparison to 
non-certified producers. However, since interviews were mostly conducted with farm managers 
and not with the actual owner of the farm, there may be some weaknesses in the data. In 
addition most producers participating on the exporting sector show a rather higher level of 
education.  
7  Conclusions 
The analysis of the decision process, coupled with the comparison of the decision process of 
certified and non-certified producers, opens up various interesting results and possibilities for 
interpretation.  
One of the most important results of the survey is that being small in size seems to be overvalued 
in the discussion, especially when talking about the technical upgrading cost of the farm. Even 
though very large farms tend to become certified to a larger extent than smaller ones, the results 
do not suggest that small producers are particularly disadvantaged in the compliance process, as 
farm size correlates only marginally with the cost of compliance.  
Instead, the results rather point to the fact that less-organized or less integrated farmers tend to be 
less favored, especially as forward integration diminishes the cost of compliance. Forward 
integration tends to be of particular importance because of the direct access to information on the 
buyers’ requirements. The vertical information flow plays a major role in the motivation to 
become certified. This is underlined by the finding that most non-integrated producers pay little 
attention to the importance of EUREPGAP in maintaining market share, in contrast to their 
vertically integrated colleagues.  
Non-integrated producers mainly depend on horizontal information from other producers 
regarding all market developments in the EU. However, the results indicate that there is little 
interest in the sector in keeping non-integrated producers in the market by providing them 
information on particular market developments. One reason for that might be the very regulated 
EU import policy for Moroccan tomatoes. Morocco is only allowed to export a preferential quota 
of around 200,000 tons of tomatoes per year to the EU, and even though it has the production   The Compliance Process of Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level  21 
capacity, Moroccan suppliers are keen not to exceed this preferential quota. Hence, exporters are 
extremely interested in aggregating much of the quota within a small group of producers. 
According to various interviewees, the already very limited number of non-integrated producers’ 
products for the export market will disappear within few years. However, this trend could of 
course change if the EU were ready to abandon its entry price system.  
Another factor which might favor the readiness of less organized producers to export would be a 
functioning information system on market development, prices and quality requirements in the 
most important export destinations. At the moment, no functioning extension service exists in the 
area of Souss Massa which could complete non-integrated farmers access to marketing 
information.  
However, using the term “small” as a synonym for less organized, less educated and technically 
less advanced production, as is often the case when analyzing smallholders’ production, tends to 
be false when looking at small producers participating in the Moroccan tomato export sector, 
where producers are often only small in relative terms, and frequently much larger in size and in 
capital and human capital than small or even medium-sized producers producing only for the 
domestic market.  
The survey only provides limited information regarding the impact of EUREPGAP certification 
on poverty in terms of excluding certain producers from the export market on poverty. As 
mentioned above, small producers in the export sector are only relatively small. Owing to their 
level of human and monetary capital, it is unlikely that these producers could fall below the 
poverty line if excluded from the export market. The domestic market has started to provide a 
market for greenhouse tomatoes, especially since the importance of higher quality tomatoes is 
increasing as supermarkets become increasingly common in the larger towns.  
Some surveys exist that find that the production of higher products improves the competitiveness 
of the sector and thus increases employment (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006 and Minton, 2006). 
Similar to these surveys, the producers excluded from production were only small in relative terms 
and do not belong to the group of smallscale farmers. However, while these articles find a positive 
poverty balance due to increasing job opportunities (resulting from increasing export capacity) for 
those who are “very poor” (e.g. migrant workers from other regions), this is not the case in the 
Moroccan tomato sector, since EU policy keeps Moroccan tomato production constant. If water 
were not a key limiting factor regarding increasing the production of high-quality tomatoes, the 
abolition of the entry price system could potentially show a positive impact on poverty in 
combination with producing high-quality tomatoes.  22  Christine Chemnitz 
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